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1 The term “cultural appropriation” is often used pejoratively; our usage is neutral. We prefer this valence-neutral 
usage because it accommodates without a proliferation of terminology the possibility that some forms of 
appropriation are ambiguous, unproblematic, or even laudable. See, for instance, Andrea Walsh’s and Dominic 
Lopes’s very useful account of the laudable re-appropriation of racist colonial imagery by First Nations artists 
(Walsh and Lopes 2009).  
2 For example, in the most recent philosophical anthology on cultural appropriation, the majority of essays take up 
questions of physical appropriation of physical remains and archeological finds, or slightly more esoteric forms of 
property ownership – such as ownership of genetic information, or intellectual property (Young and Brunk 2012). 
3 James Young discusses other types of appropriation, including content appropriation, which involves borrowing 
the content of artistic works, stories or myths of another culture (Young 2010, 6). Young also discusses what he 
calls ‘subject appropriation’, which involves adopting another culture or group as subject matter. For example, a 
white American author engages in subject appropriation when they write a book from the point of view of a Black 
African character. We take this to be a distinct phenomenon and don’t explore it directly in this paper. We do think, 
however, that our account would be a promising starting point for an analysis of the norms surrounding subject 












                                                        
4 https://www.thoughtco.com/cultural-appropriation-and-why-its-wrong-2834561; discussed in (Young 2010, 107-
113). 
5 Baraka on cultural genocide discussed in (Gracyk 2001, 113) and (Young 2010, 118-120). 
6 (Matthes 2016). 
7 See “Of Seeds and Shamans” and “Native American Intellectual Property Rights: Issues in the Control of Esoteric 
Knowledge” in (Ziff and Rao 1997).  
8 See Briahna Joy Gray on cultural exploitation: https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/09/the-question-of-cultural-
appropriation. Also: https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/03/22/471309991/when-chefs-become-famous-
cooking-other-cultures-food; discussed in (Young 2010, 114-118). 
9 Elizabeth Coleman argues for restrictions against use by outsiders of certain images from aboriginal paintings. 
Such images, says Coleman, can count as insignias, which have an essential social function, much like heraldic 
devices or official stamps. Such insignias can only perform their social function when their use is restricted to 
authorized persons. In the cases of highly threatened groups, such as aboriginal groups, the uncontrolled use of such 
insignias threatens the stability and survivability of the group (Coleman 2001). 
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appropriation	can	be	shown	to	likely	cause	harm,	then	that	fact	has	normative	significance	and	should	be	weighed	accordingly.10	But	appropriation	claims	are	often	made	in	the	absence	of	evidence	of	harm.	Thus,	harm	arguments	are	only	able	to	ground	a	limited	range	of	claims.	What	might	ground	an	appropriation	claim,	even	in	the	absence	of	evidence	of	harm?				 The	second	type	of	argument	given	in	support	of	appropriation	claims	is	what	we	call	an	‘objectionable	symbolism	argument’.	Objectionable	symbolism	arguments	hold	that	when	a	group	is	suffering	under	oppressive	power	structures,	members	of	dominant	groups	should	avoid	appropriating	from	the	oppressed	group	in	a	manner	that	draws	attention	to	the	power	imbalance	and	the	way	it	benefits	the	appropriator.	For	example,	take	the	case	of	dreadlocks.	Black	Americans	face	a	systematic	disadvantage	on	the	labor	market.	In	order	to	meet	norms	of	respectability,	they	are	under	pressure	not	to	wear	hairstyles	that	signal	Blackness.11	But	white	people	can	appropriate	Black	hairstyles	and	be	seen	as	“cool”	or	“edgy”	while	still	enjoying	a	variety	of	social	and	economic	advantages.	It	is	seen	as	distinctly	unfair	for	members	of	an	advantaged	group	to	benefit	in	this	manner	from	the	cultural	innovations	of	the	oppressed.	This	sense	of	unfairness	cannot	plausibly	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	the	property	rights	of	the	group	being	appropriated	from.	A	group	cannot	own	a	hairstyle.	The	offending	unfairness	lies	rather	in	the	background	power	dynamics	that	are	symbolically	enacted	by	cultural	appropriation.12	A	white	person	wearing	dreadlocks	can	be	interpreted	by	a	Black	onlooker	as	symbolically	enacting	the	dynamics	of	white	privilege.		In	this	case,	white	people	use	Black	cultural	innovations	as	fashion	accents	with	impunity	while	Black	people	who	display	such	indicators	are	denied	social	respect	and	economic	opportunity.			 Another	example	is	the	sale	of	imitation	Native	American	war	bonnets	as	fashion	accessories	by	retailers	such	as	Urban	Outfitters.	Many	Native	American	commentators	have	found	
                                                        
10 Cf. (Young 2010, 153).  
11 http://www.blackenterprise.com/career/dreadlocks-ban-corporate-success-stories/ 




                                                        
13 http://nativeappropriations.com/2010/04/but-why-cant-i-wear-a-hipster-headdress.html 
14 (Young 2010, 129-151).  
15 (Young 2010, 130). 
16 (Young 2010, 134).  
17 (Young 2010, 146).  
18 (Young 2010, 131).  
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symbols	is	fixed	by	the	historical	context.19	There	is	no	available	interpretation	of	these	symbols	that	is	not	profoundly	offensive.			 The	majority	of	cases,	however,	are	not	nearly	so	clear;	most	symbols	and	symbolic	acts	are	open	to	a	range	of	interpretations.	In	many	cases,	an	act	of	appropriation	could	be	taken	to	be	objectionable,	but	group	members	do	not	in	fact	find	it	to	be	objectionable.	Consider,	for	instance,	David	Bowie’s	influential	take	on	soul	music.	This	act	of	appropriation	and	its	resounding	popularity	could	be	interpreted	as	objectionably	enacting	the	dynamics	of	white	hegemony,	but	could	also	be	celebrated	as	a	mutually	beneficial	cultural	exchange,	as	it	has	been	by	those	Black	writers	who	point	to	Bowie	as	an	exemplar	of	how	to	borrow	from	other	cultures	without	causing	offense.20	Consider,	also,	divides	in	the	Indian	community	over	the	appropriation	of	the	sari:	some	view	it	as	insulting;	others	celebrate	it	as	signaling	the	mainstreaming	of	Indian	culture.21	We	therefore	think	that	many	appropriation	claims	based	on	objectionable	symbolism	arguments	are	best	understood	as	expressive	rather	than	independently	grounded.	In	such	cases,	it	is	not	the	free-standing	fact	that	an	act	of	appropriation	could	be	interpreted	in	an	objectionable	way	that	matters,	but	rather	what	matters	is	that	group	members	in	fact	find	it	objectionable.	Appropriation	claims	of	this	sort	express	the	wishes	of	group	members	that	outsiders	refrain	from	a	form	of	appropriation	that	they	find	objectionable.	These	are,	on	our	taxonomy,	expressive	claims.				 This	brings	us	to	the	third	type	of	anti-appropriation	argument	that	has	frequently	been	made:	claim	deference.	Adrienne	Keene,	a	professor	of	Native	American	studies,	articulates	a	claim	deference	argument	on	her	blog	Native	Appropriations:		But	the	thing	that	keeps	bothering	me	is	that	we’re	expected,	as	community	members,	to	have	perfectly	reasoned,	calm,	point-by-point	rebuttals	to	your	image	and	words.	The	burden	of	proof	is	on	us,	not	you.	Why	can’t	we,	as	the	cultures	you’re	“respecting”	simply	say	“no”?	Why	do	we	have	to	defend	and	fight	and	write	1400	words	about	why,	and	then	listen	while	others	mock	our	pain	and	
                                                        

















26 (Valk 2015).  
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Section	2:	The	intimacy	account	In	this	section,	we	present	an	account	of	the	normative	importance	of	expressive	appropriation	claims	that	centers	on	the	concept	of	intimacy.	We	first	present	an	account	of	group	intimacy,	and	then	we	argue	that	expressive	appropriation	claims	can	best	be	understood	as	asserting	boundaries	of	group	intimacy.			 Let’s	begin	by	considering	the	most	familiar	form	of	intimacy:	intimacy	between	individuals,	which	we	call	interpersonal	intimacy.	This	is	the	sort	of	intimacy	that	exists	between,	for	example,	romantic	couples.	Crucially,	this	form	of	intimacy	is	ordinarily	taken	to	sufficiently	ground	a	variety	of	prerogatives.	Thi	Nguyen	and	his	spouse	have	odd	pet	names	for	each	other,	and	a	funny	dance	that	they	do	when	one	of	them	is	sad.	Are	their	friends	allowed	to	witness,	use	and	transmit	those	pet	names	and	that	funny	dance?	There	is	no	independently	grounded	fact	of	the	matter;	it	simply	depends	on	where	the	couple	decides	the	boundary	should	be.	Once	the	boundary	has	been	set,	it	generates	normative	constraints	for	others.	If	Thi	and	his	spouse	do	not	want	their	friends	to	use	their	pet	names,	then	their	friends	shouldn’t	use	them.	There	is	one	important	caveat:	in	order	for	intimacy	to	ground	such	prerogatives,	the	intimate	practices	in	question	must	be	sufficiently	distinct	from	pre-existing	practices.	If	the	funny	little	dance	that	Thi	and	his	wife	do	for	each	other	is	the	Electric	Slide,	they	don’t	have	any	say	over	whether	or	not	their	friends	can	perform	it.					 Intimacy	has	received	relatively	scant	philosophical	treatment,	despite	its	evident	importance.27	Perhaps	the	most	robust	philosophical	account	of	intimacy	to	date	is	Julie	Inness’	analysis	of	intimacy	and	its	relationship	to	the	right	to	privacy.	She	points	out	that	what	the	right	to	privacy	protects	is	heterogeneous;	it	pertains	to	the	distribution	of	personal	information,	access	to	persons	and	bodies,	and	autonomy	in	decision-making.	The	only	thing	that	might	plausibly	unite	and	explain	all	the	sorts	of	things	protected	under	the	right	to	privacy,	she	argues,	is	the	concept	of	
                                                        
27 Ted Cohen’s work on intimacy, especially as it relates to humor, is an important exception, and the indirect 
inspiration for our account (Cohen 1978, 1999). However, his account does not discuss the normative consequences 




                                                        
28 (Inness 1996, 90-2).  




                                                        
30 This is a different view from the one that Young considers at (Young 2010, 125-128), according to which 
appropriation is a violation of the individual privacy of group members. We mean to identify a prerogative 
analogous to privacy. We do not claim that appropriation in general can be considered a privacy violation.  
31 Inness directly relates autonomy to the right to privacy at (Inness 1996, 95-112).  
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appropriation.	The	wish	from	members	of	a	Native	American	tribe	that	outsiders	not	perform	the	tribe's	traditional	music	would	seem	to	hold	more	weight	(other	things	being	equal)	than	a	wish	from	Christians	that	a	secular	choral	group	not	perform	“A	Mighty	Fortress	is	Our	God.”	We	now	suggest	an	explanation	for	the	asymmetry:	oppression	is	exactly	the	sort	of	contextual	consideration	that	gives	the	prerogatives	of	intimacy	heightened	normative	importance.	If	a	group	is	socially	and	politically	marginalized,	it	becomes	especially	important	to	defer	to	the	group	in	matters	relating	to	its	practices	and	institutions,	to	afford	the	group	as	much	self-determination	as	possible.				 What	we	think	is	particularly	helpful	about	relating	cultural	appropriation	to	the	concept	of	group	intimacy	is	that	considerations	of	intimacy	help	to	explain	the	normative	importance	of	expressive	appropriation	claims.	On	our	analysis,	then,	expressive	appropriation	claims	can	be	understood	as	attempts	to	set	boundaries	concerning	a	group’s	intimate	practices.	Ignoring	an	appropriation	claim	of	this	sort	might	in	some	cases	constitute	a	breach	of	intimacy.	Consider	the	recent	debate	in	Brazil	concerning	the	appropriation	of	African	head	wraps	by	non-African	Brazilians.	Ana	Maria	Gonçalves	claims	in	The	Intercept	that	the	African	diaspora	has	left	many	Africans	living	in	Brazil	without	a	sense	of	belonging.32	She	writes,	“As	a	result	of	[the	diaspora],	we	are	who	we	are:	Beings	without	a	defined	belonging,	without	easily	traceable	roots,	who	are	no	longer	from	there	and	were	never	fully	planted	here.”	She	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	head	wrap	plays	an	important	role	in	grounding	a	sense	of	common	identity	among	members	of	the	African	diaspora,	and	suggests	that	this,	along	with	the	oppression	that	African	immigrants	face,	should	give	non-Africans	sufficient	reason	to	respect	the	appropriation	claims	of	Africans	regarding	the	head	wrap.	She	writes:		 	Wearing	a	head	wrap	is	a	form	of	belonging.	It	is	joining	with	another	member	of	the	diaspora	who	also	wears	in	a	head	wrap	and,	without	needing	to	say	anything,	know	that	he	or	she	knows	that	you	





                                                        
33 http://smithsonianeducation.org/migrations/rasta/rasessay.html 




                                                        
35 (Taylor 2016, 1-2). The theme of aesthetic self-fashioning and the creation of group agency is developed 
throughout the book.  
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claims	without	needing	to	offer	supporting	evidence.36	An	account	according	to	which	the	normative	weight	of	appropriation	claims	rests	entirely	on	independent	grounds	will	be	hard-pressed	to	explain	this	standing.	The	intimacy	account,	on	the	other	hand,	can	readily	explain	why	group	members	can	have	standing	to	issue	appropriation	claims	without	supporting	evidence.	It	is	the	prerogative	of	group	members	to	collectively	set	the	boundaries	concerning	their	intimate	practices.	Issuing	an	appropriation	claim	is	a	way	for	an	individual	to	make	their	stance	regarding	such	a	boundary	known,	to	seek	its	adoption	by	the	group	and	have	it	respected	by	outsiders.		 Consider	how	well	the	intimacy	account	captures	the	kinds	of	cultural	elements	that	are	most	often	the	objects	of	appropriation	claims.	Religious	rituals,	modes	of	dress,	traditions	of	food	preparation,	musical	styles	—	these	cultural	elements	play	a	central	role	in	binding	groups	together	and	generating	a	common	identity.	Consider,	by	way	of	contrast,	the	sorts	of	cultural	elements	that,	though	characteristic	and	perhaps	even	culturally	emblematic,	are	rarely	the	subject	of	appropriation	claims.	European	circular	traffic	design,	Chinese	agricultural	terracing,	and	Japanese	techniques	for	packaging	food	for	vending	machines	do	not	derive	their	value	from	community	connection;	all	have	been	borrowed	by	other	peoples	and	cultures	with	little	resistance	on	the	cultural	appropriation	front.		The	intimacy	account	offers	an	explanation:	these	cultural	elements	do	not	have	the	same	significance	with	respect	to	the	unity	and	identity	of	the	groups	that	innovated	them	as	hairstyles,	fashion,	or	food.	Traffic	design	and	agricultural	plans	are	not	usually	ways	for	group	members	to	express	affection	for,	membership	in,	or	a	sense	of	unity	with	the	group.		The	intimacy	account	echoes	accounts	of	the	variable	usability	of	ethnic	slurs	by	insiders	and	outsiders.	As	Luvell	Anderson	argues,	certain	racial	slurs	have	different	meaning	when	used	by	an	in-group	member	than	when	used	by	an	outsider.37	When	used	by	an	insider,	a	racial	slur	can	be	used	to	express	camaraderie,	as	a	value-neutral	descriptor,	or	as	a	form	of	mild	derogation.	But	
                                                        
36 See, for example, Adrienne Keene’s remarks quoted earlier. 















                                                        
38(Rovane 2004; Toumela 2007; List 2011; Gilbert 2013; Pettit 2014a; Pettit 2014; Rovane 2014; Lackey 2017) is a 
very brief sampling of this extended literature. We have, for brevity’s sake, focused on Pettit and List’s account, but 






                                                        
39 For those interested theoretical account of such an animating basis from the literature on groups, likely candidates 
include Bryce Huebner and Marcus Hedahl’s notion of a shared interest and Margaret Gilbert’s account of joint 
commitment, both of which might plausibly ground prescriptions for behavior towards the group, but neither of 
which requires sufficient structure for group-hood to guarantee a singular voice (Huebner and Hedahl forthcoming; 
Gilbert 2013). 





                                                        
41 For example, Jennifer Lackey’s study of group assertion largely focuses on groups which are sufficiently 






                                                        















                                                        
43 A great many people have helped this paper along the way. We’d like to thank Dave Baker, Kara Barnette, Julie 
Birch, Franklin Bruno, Anthony Cross, Tilda Cvrkel, Daniel Edelstein, Melinda Fagan, Jeremy David Fix, Mollie 
Gerver, Theodore Gracyk, Sterling HolyWhiteMountain, Bryce Huebner, Melissa Hughs, Andrew Huddleston, 
Shen-yi Liao, Dominic McIver Lopes, Samantha Matherne, Erich Hatala Matthes, Nadia Mehdi, Aaron Meskin, 
Joseph Rachiele, Nick Riggle, Guy Rohrbaugh, James Shelley, Angela Shope, Nils-Hennes Stear, Katherine 
Thomson-Jones, Miles Unterreisher, Jonathan Weinberg, Aaron Zimmerman, and the audiences of the Utah 
Aesthetic Normativity Conference, the Auburn Aesthetics Forum, the Leeds Cultural Appropriation Workshop, and 
the Pacific APA – and many more.   
 31 
Valk,	Julie.	2015.	“The	‘Kimono	Wednesday’	Protests:	Identity	Politics	and	How	the	Kimono	Became	More	Than	Japanese.”	Asian	Ethnology	74	(2):	379-399.		Walsh,	Andrea	N	and	Dominic	McIver	Lopes.	2009.	Objects	of	appropriation.	In	The	Ethics	of	
Cultural	Appropriation.	Wiley-Blackwell.	Young,	James	O.	2010.	Cultural	Appropriation	and	the	Arts.	West	Sussex:	Wiley	Blackwell.	Young,	James	O	and	Conrad	G	Brunk.	2012.	The	Ethics	of	Cultural	Appropriation.	John	Wiley	&	Sons.	 	Ziff,	Bruce	and	Pratima	V.	Rao,	eds.	1997.	Borrowed	Power:	Essays	on	Cultural	Appropriation.	New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press.			
